In this study, we examine whether and how borrowing firms' financial statement comparability affects the contracting features of syndicated loans. Using a sample of loans issued by U.S. public firms in the syndicated loan market over the period 1992-2008, we find strong and robust evidence that financial statement comparability is negatively associated with loan spread and the likelihood of pledging collateral, and positively associated with loan maturity and the likelihood of including performance pricing provisions in loan contracts. We also find that borrowing firms with greater financial statement comparability are able to complete the loan syndication process more swiftly, form loan syndicates enabling the lead lenders to retain smaller percentages of loan shares, and attract a greater number of lenders and, particularly, a greater number of uninformed participating lenders. Altogether, these findings are consistent with the view that financial statement comparability plays an important role in alleviating information asymmetry in the syndicated loan market.
INTRODUCTION
A ccounting comparability has a long history (Simmons 1967) , and it is an important attribute of accounting information that helps users ''to identify and understand similarities in, and differences among, items'' (Financial Accounting Standards Board [FASB] 2010).
1 Economic decision-making involves choosing among alternatives, and ''investing and lending decisions . . . cannot be made rationally if comparative information is not available'' (FASB 1980) . Thus, standard setters position comparability as an important ''enhancing qualitative characteristic'' of accounting information that facilitates capital allocation and nurtures investor confidence (Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC] 2000; FASB 2010; International Accounting Standards Board [IASB] 2010). For instance, Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAC) No. 8 prescribes that ''information about a reporting entity is more useful if it can be compared with similar information about other entities and with similar information about the same entity for another period or another date '' (FASB 2010) . Correspondingly, it is expected that comparability benefits financial statement users by helping them to better process information at a reduced cost. 2 In this study, we examine whether accounting comparability affects the contracting features of syndicated loans.
Recent academic studies (e.g., De Franco, Kothari, and Verdi 2011; Kim, Kraft, and Ryan 2013; Chen, Collins, Kravet, and Mergenthaler 2015; Shane, Smith, and Zhang 2014) show evidence of the benefits of accounting comparability on capital markets, including both equity and public debt markets. However, an important segment of the capital markets, the syndicated loan market, has largely been overlooked in the literature on accounting comparability. By focusing on the syndicated loan market, our study examines whether and how accounting comparability is associated with various features of syndicated loans, including contractual terms (i.e., pricing and non-pricing terms, such as collateral requirements, loan maturity, and the provision of financial covenants) and loan syndication duration and structure. Such an inquiry would reveal the specific channels through which accounting information has important implications on the design of private debt contracts (Watts and Zimmerman 1986; Ball 2001 ) beyond cost of capital.
The economic importance and unique features of the syndicated loan market motivate our focus on this particular market. The syndicated loan market has grown quickly over the past several decades; more than 50 percent of corporate financing in the U.S. is raised through syndicated lending (Sufi 2007) . 3, 4 As suggested in Bharath, J. Sunder, and S. Sunder (2008) , bank lenders can obtain information directly from borrowers and renegotiation is easier in the syndicated loan market and, thus, financial reporting might play a limited role in this market. It is ex ante unclear that financial reporting quality, including comparability, has an impact on the decisions of debt contracting. No prior study has investigated whether and how accounting comparability affects debt contracting in the syndicated loan market. Further, the syndicated loan market involves different types of lenders that face different levels of information asymmetry. 5 It is likely that accounting comparability is useful in reducing the information asymmetry among different lenders, which potentially affects the contractual terms and syndication process of the syndicated loans that cannot be studied in the public bond setting. Therefore, the importance and the uniqueness of the syndicated loan market make it compelling to examine whether and how accounting comparability is relevant in reducing information asymmetry in this market. Given that lenders (private or public) are primary users of general purpose financial reporting, such an investigation also attends to the inquiry of the extent to which the objective of financial reporting may have been attained. 6 We employ a sample of U.S. publicly listed firms that borrowed from the syndicated loan market during the period of 1992-2008. Using comparability measures developed by De Franco et al. (2011) , we first show that comparability is negatively associated with cost of debt (i.e., loan spread) after controlling for a series of factors determining loan spread. We then turn our focus to non-pricing contractual terms. We document that, ceteris paribus, firms with higher comparability take loans with longer maturity, and they are less likely to pledge collateral in loan contracts as compared to firms with lower comparability. These findings are robust to the estimation of joint determination of pricing and non-pricing contractual terms. Overall, these results suggest that comparability enhances lenders' ability to better process financial statement information and monitor borrowers and, thus, lenders are more willing to offer loans with more lenient terms, such as longer maturity and no collateral requirements. We also find evidence that more comparable accounting information increases the likelihood of including accounting-based performance pricing provisions in loan contracts.
Next, we examine the implications of comparability for loan syndication duration and loan syndicate structure. Additional evidence shows that comparability is negatively associated with loan syndication duration and the ownership of loans retained by lead lender(s), and positively associated with the number of participating lenders, including uninformed participating lenders. These results suggest that comparable financial statement information helps mitigate information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders, and between lenders with varying roles in the syndication (i.e., lead versus participating lenders). This finding corroborates our argument that financial statement comparability is an important accounting mechanism to resolve information frictions in the syndicated loan market.
Our results are robust to a series of sensitivity analysis. For example, to address the concern that our accounting comparability measures may capture the effect of economic comparability, we construct a measure of accrual comparability to reflect the similarity of accrual accounting in mapping firms' underlying performance to accounting numbers. Using this alternative measure, we find similar evidence suggesting the benefits of financial statement comparability in debt contracting.
Overall, our study provides evidence on the relevance and importance of comparability to the syndicated loan market. It contributes to the literature along several dimensions. First, it adds to the growing literature on the benefits of comparability in capital markets. Recent studies examine the impact of comparability on the equity market (e.g., Campbell and Yeung 2011; De Franco et al. 2011; Shane et al. 2014; Chen et al. 2015) . We extend this line of research to an important segment of the capital markets, the syndicated loan market, and show that comparability matters for private debt investors by providing evidence that firms with higher accounting comparability receive loans with more favorable terms (i.e., lower cost of borrowing, longer maturity, and less likely to pledge collateral). We further show that comparability significantly influences the loan syndication process by shortening the time to complete syndications and facilitating organization of more diversified ownerships. Thus, our empirical evidence suggests that comparability reduces information asymmetry both between the borrowers and lenders and between the lead and participating lenders-a new insight on the beneficial role of accounting comparability.
Our study complements Kim et al.'s (2013) findings. While Kim et al. (2013) examine the benefits of comparability for firms in the setting of public bonds, it is not clear that their findings can be inferred for the setting of private loan contracting, i.e., the syndicated loan market. Furthermore, because Kim et al.'s (2013) measure of accounting comparability requires that firms are rated and a significant number of borrowing firms do not have credit ratings (43 percent in our sample), the generalizability of their study is potentially limited. By using De Franco et al.'s (2011) measure of accounting comparability, we provide large-sample evidence of the benefits of accounting comparability in debt contracting. More importantly, compared to Kim et al. (2013) , we provide additional insights into how accounting comparability benefits firms beyond the lower cost of capital, including non-pricing contractual terms and the loan syndication process (Merton 1987) .
Finally, the findings in our study have practical implications for the ongoing policy debates relating to the adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards (hereafter, IFRS). The IASB argues that a single set of financial accounting standards will help investors make economic decisions as it ''levels the playing field'' for financial statements prepared by firms across countries (European Parliament and the Council of the European Union 2002, Regulation [EC] No. 1606/2002, Para. 1). Since 2002, the FASB and IASB have been working on converging U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and IFRS, aiming at achieving a single set of high-quality accounting standards that provide market participants with comparable accounting information. Given that syndicated loans today represent the largest single financing tool in the U.S., our study lends support to the SEC's (2010) consideration of IFRS adoption or, as a more practical alternative, allowing U.S. companies to provide voluntary, supplemental IFRS-based financial information in addition to the required GAAP financial statements (Schnurr 2014) . This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we review the literature and develop hypotheses. The third section describes the sample, variable measurements, and research design. We present our empirical results in the fourth section. Finally, the fifth section presents our conclusions.
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES The Syndicated Loan Market and Syndication Process
A syndicated loan is a loan given to a business by a group of lenders under the administration of lead lenders. The objective is to finance large-scale projects over the medium to long term. Since the early 2000s, the popularity of syndicated loans has exploded, and a large proportion of corporate loans have been syndicated. Relative to other financing alternatives, syndicated loans account for approximately one-third of all corporate financing and they represent the largest single financing tool used in corporate America. According to Weidner (2000) in American Banker, the underwriting revenue generated for the financial sector in the syndicated loan market is more than the sum of the revenues generated from both equity and debt underwriting. Standard & Poor's (2011) indicates that the syndicated loan market has become an efficient way to obtain capital from a wide spectrum of loan investors, including not only traditional commercial banks, but also finance companies, institutional investors, and loan mutual funds.
The loan syndication process typically begins with the lead lender obtaining a mandate from the loan issuer. Based on its evaluation of the loan issuer's prospects, the winning lead lender prepares an information memo outlining the proposed terms of the contract, including pricing, maturity, and collateral. At the same time, the lead lender solicits informal feedback from Financial Statement Comparability and Debt Contracting: Evidence from the Syndicated Loan Marketpotential investors on their interest in the deal, especially with respect to pricing and investment commitment. Based on the feedback received from potential loan investors, the lead lender makes adjustments to loan pricing and non-pricing terms. Once all terms are finalized, the deal is marketed to loan investors in general, and the final terms are then documented in detailed credit and security agreements. After the loan syndication process is closed, the lead lender takes the responsibility of monitoring loan performance, covenant compliance, and renegotiation in case of covenant violations. In the loan syndication and post-issuance periods, lead lenders serve as important delegated monitors, which is different from the public bond market, in which lenders are more dispersed and, therefore, less likely to engage in monitoring (Amihud et al. 1999) .
Financial Statement Comparability
Recent research examining the role of comparability in capital markets considers equity market participants and public bond market participants. De Franco et al. (2011) develop a measure of financial statement comparability and find that this measure is positively related to the number of equity analysts following and forecast accuracy, and it is negatively related to forecast dispersion. These authors suggest that financial statement comparability lowers the cost of acquiring and processing information, and increases the overall quantity and quality of public information. Campbell and Yeung (2011) find that when financial statements of a firm of interest and its peer firms are more comparable: (1) the impact of peer firms' earnings news on firm stock price is greater; (2) the drift following the peer firms' earnings announcement is smaller; and (3) the reversal at the firm's own earnings announcement is smaller. Chen et al. (2015) conclude that acquirers make better acquisition decisions when target firms' accounting information exhibits greater comparability with industry peer firms, and this effect is stronger when acquirers have relatively limited knowledge about target firms. Using variations in the adjustments made to interest coverage ratios and non-recurring income items as a measure of financial comparability, Kim et al. (2013) examine the effects of comparability on the valuation uncertainty of public bonds. These authors find that higher comparability is associated with lower bid-ask spread, lower credit default swap, and steeper credit spread term structures.
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Hypothesis Development
Contractual Terms-Pricing and Non-Pricing
In this study, we focus on the effect of accounting comparability on debt contracting in an important credit market segment, namely, the syndicated loan market. In this market, lenders evaluate alternative investment opportunities based on a wide range of information, including information presented in financial statements. As SFAC No. 8 (FASB 2010) implies, more comparable accounting information across alternatives may be more useful than less comparable accounting information for the purpose of lending, because comparability can reduce the cost of processing information by lenders and facilitate monitoring by lead lenders. Therefore, firms with more comparable information potentially have lower valuation uncertainty or allow lead lenders to incur lower monitoring costs. If this is the case, then we expect that borrowers with more comparable financial statements with their industry peers will enjoy lower costs of debts.
However, there are several counter-forces that could mitigate the negative association between cost of debt and accounting comparability in the syndicated loan market. First, bank lenders are known to have superior access to information from borrowers and they may rely to a lesser extent on public information such as financial statements. Second, banks can set both the pricing and non-pricing terms in response to borrowers' accounting attributes. As a result, lenders may substitute nonpricing terms (e.g., collateral requirement and loan maturity) for pricing terms in dealing with firms with less comparable accounting information, leading to no effect of accounting comparability on pricing terms (e.g., cost of debt). We state the first hypothesis (in the alternative form):
H1: Ceteris paribus, borrowers with higher accounting comparability are associated with lower cost of debt.
In addition to the pricing terms, accounting comparability may have effects on non-pricing terms in loan contracts. Prior literature suggests that pricing and non-pricing terms are used as substitutes in debt contracting (Melnik and Plaut 1986; Bharath et al. 2008 ). Rajan and Winston (1995) and Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991) argue that collateral is used as an alternative monitoring mechanism to reduce borrowers' moral hazard problem and curb borrowers' risk-taking incentives. Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan (2011) find that, since relationship lenders are more likely to commit to monitoring borrowers, relationship lender-led loans are less likely to require collateral. Graham, Li, and Qiu (2008) document that firms that restate their earnings are more likely to be required to pledge collateral after restatements. We conjecture that if accounting comparability facilitates high-quality information communication between lenders and borrowers and effectively improves lenders' ex post monitoring, then lenders are less likely to impose collateral requirements. Accordingly, we state our hypothesis as follows:
H2a: Ceteris paribus, borrowers with higher financial statement comparability are less likely to be required to pledge collateral for loans.
Another important non-pricing term that may be used as a substitute for pricing terms is loan maturity. Diamond (1991b) posits that shorter maturity may subject borrowing firms to liquidity shock due to the need to obtain financing frequently; therefore, shortening maturity may serve as a monitoring mechanism to keep borrowing firms in check. Consistent with this theoretical argument, Barclay and Smith (1995) find that firms requiring greater monitoring efforts (e.g., growth firms) have more short-term debt. Ortiz-Molina and Penas (2008) show that firms with low credit quality and an opaque information environment are more likely to issue short-term debt. If comparable accounting information improves ex post monitoring efficiency, then we predict that firms with high accounting comparability can borrow loans with longer maturity. Our hypothesis states as follows:
H2b: Ceteris paribus, borrowers with higher financial statement comparability are able to take loans with longer maturity.
Both performance pricing provisions and financial covenants expand the importance of accounting information in debt contracts, and including these features in loan contracts allows lenders to perform efficient monitoring of borrowers after loan issuance (Rajan and Winston 1995; Asquith, Beatty, and Weber 2005) . More comparable accounting information can enhance the effectiveness of performance pricing and covenants by providing readily available references for lenders to make a judgment on the performance of the borrowing firms. This suggests that borrowers' accounting comparability is positively associated with the likelihood of using a performance pricing provision and financial covenants in debt contracting. Alternatively, to the extent that comparability reduces information asymmetry between the borrowers and lenders, it may consequently reduce the need to include performance pricing and financial covenants in the contract. Thus, a priori, we make no directional predictions on the relationship between borrowers' accounting comparability and the inclusion of performance pricing provisions and financial covenants in loan contracts. We posit that:
H2c: Ceteris paribus, borrowers' financial statement comparability has no association with the inclusion of performance pricing provisions in loan contracts.
H2d: Ceteris paribus, borrowers' financial statement comparability has no association with the inclusion of financial covenants in loan contracts.
Loan Syndication Process
The loan syndication process begins with borrowers engaging lead lenders (i.e., at the launch date) and closes at the time when loans become available for borrowers (i.e., at the deal active date). This process resembles the initial public offering (IPO) process, in which the time between the launch date and the IPO date is a function of information asymmetry between an issuer and prospective investors (Ritter and Welch 2002) . The syndicated loan market involves a similar process, in which the borrower engages lead lenders to distribute loans to other participant lenders. In the loan syndication process, lead lenders are equipped with more information than other participating lenders, since lead lenders have either established a relationship with the borrower through previous interactions or are in direct talks with the borrower. As a result, information asymmetry exists between lead and participating lenders.
The duration between the launch date and the date when the loan becomes available for borrowers (syndication duration) reflects the degree of information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders, and between lead and participating lenders (Ivashina and Sun 2011) . 8 Bozanic, Loumioti, and Vasvari (2015) find that standardization of accounting numbers in loan agreements reduces loan syndication duration. We argue that accounting comparability, by enabling relatively less informed participating lenders to learn from their experience with other borrowers in similar situations, has the potential to lessen the information asymmetry between them and more informed lenders. Accordingly, we expect to observe loan syndication duration to be shorter for borrowing firms with more comparable financial statements. This yields the following hypothesis:
H3a: Ceteris paribus, loan syndication duration is negatively associated with borrowing firms' financial statement comparability.
Comparability could also impact how loans are structured. In the syndicated loan market, lead lenders are delegated monitors that are responsible for monitoring the creditworthiness of borrowers in the post-initiation period (after the loan syndication agreement is signed), and participant lenders mainly rely on lead lenders' monitoring. However, lead lenders may have incentives to shirk their monitoring duties because they only have partial subscription of the loans and their losses are also limited to the portion of the loans they are subscribed to.
9 Furthermore, while lead lenders can obtain private information directly from borrowers, participant lenders are typically provided with information memos stripped of confidential material information and, therefore, participant lenders rely on publicly available information to a greater extent than lead lenders. As a result, the syndicated loan market posits a severe problem of information asymmetry between lead lenders and participant lenders due to both adverse selection and moral hazard. To attenuate these problems associated with loan syndication, lead lenders may choose to make a voluntary commitment to retain a larger proportion of the syndicated loan and/or form a loan syndicate with a smaller number of non-lead lenders to participate.
10 Empirically, Sufi (2007) finds that, to signal the lead bank's commitment, the lead bank retains a larger share of the syndicated loan and forms a more concentrated syndicate when information asymmetry between a borrower and lenders is higher. Ball, Bushman, and Vasvari (2008) find that when a borrower's accounting information possesses higher debt contracting value, information asymmetry between the lead lender(s) and other syndicate participants is lower, allowing lead lender(s) to hold a smaller proportion of new loan deals. Accordingly, we argue that enhanced accounting comparability makes financial statement information easier to be processed and ready to be referenced against, which could alleviate the information asymmetry problems in syndicated lending. Thus, we predict that as borrowers' financial information comparability enhances, more lenders, including ex ante uninformed lenders, will be attracted to participate in the syndication as a result of lower information asymmetry, and lead lenders will be more likely to hold a smaller proportion of loans. This leads to the following hypotheses:
H3b: Ceteris paribus, the number of lenders and the number of ex ante uninformed lenders in a loan syndicate are positively associated with borrowing firms' financial statement comparability.
H3c: Ceteris paribus, the percentage of loan shares retained by lead lenders is negatively associated with borrowing firms' financial statement comparability.
SAMPLE AND VARIABLE MEASUREMENT
Data and Sample
Our data cover U.S. publicly listed firms issuing loans in the syndicated loan market during the period 1992-2008, obtained from the DealScan database. The DealScan database provides information on loans obtained at the firm level and details both the pricing and non-pricing terms for each loan, including loan amount, loan inception, loan maturity, covenants, collateralization requirements, loan purposes, loan market segment, and cost of loans measured by the number of basis points above the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR). Loan packages or deals can have several facilities for the same borrower and the same contract date. We include each facility as a separate sample observation because loan characteristics vary with each facility.
In addition, we collect: (1) stock data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) stock files; (2) firm-level accounting data from Compustat annual files; (3) analyst data from the Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (I/B/E/S); and (4) institutional ownership data from the Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings database. To mitigate the influence of extreme observations, we winsorize the top and bottom 1 percent of outliers for each variable. Our final sample consists of 11,265 loan facilities borrowed by 7,054 firms for the period 1992-2008. 9 In loan syndication agreements, lead agent banks routinely add a clause to indicate that participant lenders should be responsible for their own credit decisions. 10 In the syndicated loan market, funding is typically provided by a group of lenders, rather than a single lender, for the purpose of risk sharing among different lenders (Esty 2001) . One single lender could provide all funds needed for a borrower and receive all the interest revenue on the loan, but this lender is also subject to a greater default risk. Therefore, risk sharing is an important feature of the syndicated loan market. For borrowers with greater information risk and credit risk, the loan syndicate tends to be more concentrated; that is, lead lenders will assume a greater percentage of loan shares so that they are incentivized to monitor borrowers, for the reasons discussed here.
Measuring Comparability
Based on FASB (1980 ), De Franco et al. (2011 define financial statement comparability as follows: ''Two firms have comparable accounting systems if, for a given set of economic events, they produce similar financial statements.'' In other words, two firms with comparable accounting should have similar mappings such that for a given set of economic events, one firm produces similar financial statements as the other firm. De Franco et al. (2011) use stock returns as a measure for the net effect of economic events on firms' financial statements. These economic events may be unique to the firm, but may also be due to industry-or economy-wide shocks. The proxy for financial statements is earnings, an important income statement measure.
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Following De Franco et al. (2011), we construct two comparability measures, CompAcct4 and CompAcctInd, to measure how comparable a firm's accounting is to those of its peers, the four most comparable firms and industry, respectively. The detailed discussion of the construction of comparability measures is presented in Appendix A.
Research Design
We estimate the following models:
where the dependent variable Loan Term refers to the proxies for the pricing and non-pricing terms and the syndication process of a loan contract for a borrower i in year t; and Comparability is one of the two accounting comparability measures. In testing H1, we follow Bharath et al. (2011) and use ''all-in-spread-drawn'' (AISD) as the measure of cost of debt, where AISD is defined as the total spread (including associated annual fees, if any) paid over LIBOR on the drawn amount for each loan. We label this variable as Spread. To test H2a and H2b, we use loan maturity and the presence of loan collateral as dependent variables. Specifically, loan maturity, labeled as Log(Maturity), is the natural logarithm of the number of months a loan matures. The presence of loan collateral is captured by the variable Secured, which takes the value 1 if the loan facility is secured by collateral, and 0 otherwise. To test H2c (H2d), we measure the dependent variables by the presence of an accounting-based performance pricing provision (financial covenants) in loan contracts, where the indicator variable ACC Ratio PP (Financial Covenants) equals 1 when the loan contains accounting-based performance pricing (at least one financial covenant), and 0 otherwise. For H3a-H3c, we use loan syndication duration, number of participating lenders or number of uninformed participating lenders, and share of loans held by lead lenders as dependent variables, respectively. Loan syndication duration (Synd_ Duration) is calculated as the number of days between loan launch date and deal active date. We count the number of participating lenders in a loan facility (#Part_Lenders). We define ''uninformed participating lenders'' as participating lenders that have no prior lending relation with the borrower. We count the number of such lenders in each loan facility as a measure of the number of uninformed participating lenders (#Uninform_Lenders). The share of loans held by lead lenders (%Lead_ Lender) is the percentage of loan share retained by lead lenders in a loan syndicate.
Following prior literature (e.g., Sufi 2007; Bharath et al. 2011; Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman 2011) , the following set of firm-specific variables are controlled for wherever appropriate:
Stkvol t ¼ the standard deviation of firm-specific daily returns in fiscal year t, based on the market model; MB t ¼ market-to-book ratio at the end of fiscal year t; LEV t ¼ book value of all liabilities divided by total assets at the end of fiscal year t; Prof t (the profitability ratio) ¼ the ratio of EBITDA to SALES, where EBITDA is earnings before interest, tax, and depreciation and amortization; LnSize t ¼ natural logarithm of assets at the end of fiscal year t; Opaque t ¼ the three-year moving sum of the absolute value of annual performance-adjusted discretionary accruals from fiscal years t-2 to t (Kothari, Leone, and Wasley 2005);
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Conservatism ¼ the cumulative non-operating accruals over three years prior to the year of loan initiation (Beatty, Weber, and Yu 2008) ; Analyst t ¼ the natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of analysts following the firm; Notrated t ¼ an indicator variable equal to 1 if the borrower does not have an S&P credit rating, and 0 otherwise; and Litigation t ¼ an indicator variable equal to 1 when the firm is in the biotechnology (SIC codes 2833-2836 and 8731-8734), computer (SIC codes 3570-3577 and 7370-7374), electronics (SIC codes 3600-3674), or retail (SIC codes 5200-5961) industries, and 0 otherwise.
We include the measure of accrual quality (Opaque) in the maturity and loan syndicate structure regressions and both Opaque and Conservatism in the spread, performance pricing, and financial covenants regressions. 13 We also control for a series of loan-specific variables: Loanamount t , the natural logarithm of the loan amount in U.S. dollars; Multilender t , an indicator variable set to 1 if a loan has multiple lenders, and 0 otherwise; Lev Loan t , an indicator variable set to 1 if the market segment of the loan is a leveraged loan segment, and 0 otherwise; and Cov_Intensity t , the number of financial covenants contained in a loan contract divided by the largest number of financial covenants in all debt contracts. We also control for Loan Purpose, including leveraged buyout, loan repayment, takeover, and corporate purpose. In the accounting-based performance pricing regression, we include an indicator variable, Rating_PP, set to 1 if a loan contract contains credit rating-based performance pricing, and 0 otherwise. We use ordinary least squares (OLS) to test the effect of comparability on loan spread, maturity, loan syndication duration, and loan syndicate structure. We use probit models to estimate the effect of comparability on the probability of imposing collateral requirements and using accounting-based performance pricing and financial covenants. All regressions include industry (one-digit SIC codes) and year dummies to control for industry and year fixed effects with White standard errors corrected for firm clustering.
14 A summary of all the variable definitions and measurements used in this paper can be found in Appendix B.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the key variables used in our regression models. The means (medians) of the comparability measures CompAcct4 it and CompAcctInd it are À0.53 and À2.04 (À0.23 and À1.45), respectively. These are comparable to those reported by De Franco et al. (2011) . The mean and standard deviation of Spread are 167.51 and 137.39, which are comparable to those reported in Bharath et al. (2008) . The average loan maturity is 44 months, with a standard deviation of 25 months. About 55 percent of the loan facilities do not require collateral. Mean syndication duration is 34 days, with a median of 28 days, which is comparable with observations reported in Ivashina and Sun (2011) . The average lead lender share is 23 percent for our loan sample, and the number of participating lenders and the number of uninformed participating lenders are 5 and 3, on average, respectively. Panels B and C of Table 1 present a Pearson correlation matrix for the variable of interest. Our comparability measures, CompAcct4 it and CompAcctInd it , are significantly and positively correlated with each other, suggesting that they are picking up similar information. The correlation coefficient between CompAcct4 it and CompAcctInd it , 0.83, is comparable to that reported by De Franco et al. (2011) . Loan spread is negatively associated with both measures of comparability at the 1 percent significance level. The presence of collateral (i.e., Secured) is negatively associated with both measures of comparability at the 1 percent significance level, providing supporting evidence for H2a. The number of participants and the number of uninformed participants are positively associated with both measures of comparability at the 1 percent level, consistent with H3b. Untabulated correlation analysis also indicates that Synd_Duration and %Lead_Lender are negatively associated with the measures of comparability at the 10 percent significance level or better. (1) and (2), respectively. Consistent with H1, the coefficients on CompAcct4 it and CompAcctInd it are both significantly negative at the 1 percent significance level (t-statistics ¼À4.092 and À4.311). We interpret these findings as a high degree of comparability facilitating lenders' information processing and mitigating the information asymmetry problem between borrowers and lenders, which ultimately leads to lower cost of loans. In terms of the economic significance, our evidence suggests that a one-standard-deviation increase in accounting comparability measured by CompAcct4 would lead to a significant reduction in spread by about eight basis points, which is equivalent to about 5 percent of the sample mean of loan spread and $298,900 annual interest expense charged on a loan with an average loan size. 15, 16 As reported, the coefficients on firm-specific control variables in Table 2 are generally consistent with our expectations. For example, the coefficients on leverage and stock return volatility are significantly positive, implying that riskier firms borrow 13 All of our regression models are robust to the inclusion of measures of accrual quality and accounting conservatism concurrently. The results are available upon request. 14 Our results are also robust to two-way clustering of standard errors by year and firm. 15 The average loan size is $373.62 million ( Table 1 ). The annual interest savings due to higher accounting comparability is calculated as 373.62 Ã 8/ 10,000 ¼ 0.2989 million. 16 We acknowledge that the economic magnitude of the effect of accounting comparability on the cost of syndicated loans is smaller in our setting as compared to that on public bonds (Kim et al. 2013) . This is consistent with our view that, for loan syndication, lenders tend to trade off pricing terms with other contractual terms and non-contractual arrangements when providing a syndicated loan to borrowers. money at higher cost. Consistent with Bharath et al. (2008) , the coefficients on Opaque are significantly positive. Regarding loan-specific control variables, we find the expected coefficients on Log(Maturity), Log(LoanSize), Secured, and Rel_Dum, which are in line with Bharath et al. (2011) . Overall, the evidence shows that, on average, borrowing firms with higher comparability have loans at lower costs compared to those with lower comparability, and this effect holds after controlling for a number of firm-specific and loanspecific characteristics.
Testing H1: Comparability and Loan Pricing
Testing H2: Comparability and Non-Pricing Contractual Terms
In H2, we predict that firms with higher comparability are less likely to be required to impose collateral (H2a) and also able to borrow loans with longer maturity (H2b). Columns (1) and (3) of Table 3 present the results for testing H2a using CompAcct4 it and CompAcctInd it as measures of comparability, and Columns (2) and (4) present the results for marginal effect of the regressions evaluating the incremental change in the probability of imposing collateral for a one-standard-deviation increase from the mean values of variables of interest. We find that the coefficients on CompAcct4 it and CompAcctInd it are À0.223 and À0.129 (t-statistics ¼À6.999 and À8.349), respectively. The marginal effect results presented in Columns (2) and (4) suggest that a onestandard-deviation increase in accounting comparability measured by CompAcct4 it (CompAcctInd it ) reduces the probability of requiring collateral in a loan by 5.40 percent (7.10 percent), holding all other explanatory variables at their mean values. The results are in line with H2a, that borrowers with higher comparability are less likely to be required to have collateral in loan contracts. From the lender's perspective, if the borrowing firm presents comparable financial information, then it would ease the .18*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** À0.38*** 0.38*** 16. #Part_Lenders 0.05*** 0.08*** 0.30*** 0.028*** 0.16*** 0.07*** À0.12*** À0.08*** À0.25*** À0.28*** 0.20*** 17. #Uninform_ Lenders 0.03*** 0.05*** 0.22*** 0.01 0.10*** 0.06*** À0.09*** À0.06*** À0.18*** À0.20*** 0.14*** 18. Syndicate 0.03*** 0.06*** 0.27*** 0.00 0.13*** 0.15*** À0.13*** À0.17*** À0.21*** À0.20*** 0.25*** 19. Revolver 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.16*** 0.02*** À0.05*** 0.06*** À0.05*** À0.08*** À0.06*** À0.14*** 0.13*** 20. Institutional Loan À0.13*** À0.12*** À0.03*** À0.02* 0.12*** À0.02** À0.00 0.04*** À0.07*** À0.05*** 0.04*** 21. Lev Loan À0.25*** À0.30*** À0.41*** À0.11*** 0.03*** À0.18*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.19*** À0.38*** 0.42*** 22. Numcovenants À0.10*** À0.12*** À0.28*** À0.03*** À0.06*** 0.04*** 0.14*** 0.05*** 0.18*** À0.26*** 0.20*** 23. Rel_Dum 0.05*** 0.08*** 0.35*** 0.04*** 0.20*** 0.11*** À0.14*** À0.10*** À0.31*** 0.29*** À0.26*** 18. Syndicate À0.15*** 0.11*** 0.13*** À0.08*** 0.19*** 0.15*** 1 19. Revolver À0.39*** 0.04*** À0.24*** À0.25*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.07*** 1 20. Institutional Loan 0.34*** 0.01 0.33*** 0.24*** 0.03*** 0.06*** 0.07*** À0.48*** 1 21. Lev Loan 0.64*** À0.19*** 0.15*** 0.51*** À0.14*** À0.10*** À0.01 À0.28*** 0.30*** 1 22. Numcovenants 0.24*** À0.14*** 0.19*** 0.44*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.08*** À0.14*** 0.16*** 0.34*** 1 23. Rel_Dum À0.21*** 0.19*** À0.00 À0.16*** 0.24*** 0.15*** 0.19*** 0.07*** 0.01 À0.15*** À0.04*** 1 *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. This lender's monitoring efforts and reduce the lender's need to use collateral to protect against information risk. The results on the coefficients of control variables are generally consistent with those reported in Bharath et al. (2011) . Next, to test the effect of comparability on loan maturity (H2b), we include two additional control variables that are unique for the determination of loan maturity. According to Hart and Moore (1994) , firms tend to match their loan maturity with asset maturity. Therefore, we include asset maturity as an explanatory variable for loan maturity. The measure of asset maturity, Log(Asset Maturity), is calculated as the natural logarithm of the total amount of property, plant, and equipment deflated by total depreciation. Following Barclay and Smith (1995) , we include an indicator variable for regulated industries. On one hand, industries that are subject to government regulation may have lower agency costs, allowing them to borrow longer-term debts. On the other hand, it may be easier for firms in regulated industries to borrow long-term debts from the public market, which, in turn, gives rise to more short-term debts from syndicated loan markets for these firms. Thus, the predicted sign on regulated industry is not clear. The results are reported in Table 4 . We find that the coefficients on CompAcct4 and CompAcctInd are positive and significant at the 10 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively (t-statistics ¼ 1.659 and 2.907). The findings suggest that for a one-standard-deviation increase in accounting comparability, the loan maturity is increased by 1.54 percent (3 percent), which is about 20 (41) days for loans with an average loan maturity. The results confirm our prediction in H2b that firms with more comparable financial reporting are able to take loans with longer maturity. We also find that the coefficients on Log(Asset Maturity) (Regulated Industry) are significantly positive (negative), suggesting that firms with longer asset maturity (in regulated industries) tend to borrow longer-term (shorter-term) loans from the syndicated market.
In H2c and H2d, we make non-directional predictions regarding the effect of comparability on the use of performance pricing and financial covenants. The results are reported in Table 5 . The coefficients on comparability measures are significantly positive when the presence of accounting-based performance pricing is used as the dependent variable (t-statistics ¼ 1.853 and 2.330, respectively), but not significant when the indicator of financial covenants contained in debt contracts is used as the dependent variable. 17 The positive and significant coefficients on the two comparability measures in the accountingbased performance pricing regressions suggest that a one-standard-deviation increase from their mean value in these two variables increases the chance of using performance pricing in loan contracts by about 1.0 percent and 1.4 percent, respectively.
Testing H3: The Loan Syndication Process
As discussed in the ''Background and Hypotheses'' section, loan syndication duration hinges on the information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders, and on lead lenders and other loan investors. It is expected that the coefficients on CompAcct4 and CompAcctInd are negative, i.e., more comparable accounting information helps to mitigate information asymmetry, thus facilitating formation of loan syndicates. The regression results are reported in Table 6 . Consistent with H3a, we find that the coefficient on CompAcct4 is significant at the 5 percent level (one-tailed test), implying that a one-standarddeviation increase from its mean in accounting comparability measured by CompAcct4 reduces the loan syndication time by 3.6 days, which is about 11 percent of the sample mean. The coefficient on CompAcctInd is marginally significant at the 10 percent level (one-tailed test). These results are consistent with H3a, that loan syndication duration is shorter for borrowing firms with more comparable financial statements.
To test H3b and H3c, we estimate the effect of comparability on loan syndicate structure, and expect the coefficient on the measures of comparability to be positive when #Part_Lenders and #Uninform_Lenders are the dependent variables and be negative when %Lead_Lender is the dependent variable. Table 7 presents the results for the regressions. The coefficients on CompAcct4 and CompAcctInd are significantly positive (t-statistics ¼ 2.836 and 2.894, respectively) at the 1 percent level for #Part_Lenders regression; the coefficients on CompAcct4 and CompAcctInd are significantly positive (t-statistics ¼3.086 and 3.320, respectively) for the #Uninform_Lenders regression, supporting H3b, that firms with more comparable financial statements are able to attract a greater number of loan investors, as well as a greater number of uninformed loan investors, into a loan syndicate. In Columns (5) and (6), the coefficients on CompAcct4 and CompAcctInd are significantly negative (t-statistics ¼À2.501 and À2.885, respectively) when the share of the loan retained by the lead lenders is used as the dependent variable, suggesting that comparability reduces information asymmetries between participating lenders and lead lenders, allowing lead lenders to retain a smaller percentage of loans (consistent with H3c). The economic magnitude is also significant. For example, a one-standard-deviation increase in the accounting comparability measured by CompAcct4 would reduce the percentage of loan share retained by lead lenders by about 1.33 percent, representing about $4.97 million for a loan with average loan size. The coefficients on control variables are generally consistent with those reported in Sufi (2007) . In summary, we find strong evidence that comparability of the borrowing firm affects how a loan syndicate is structured. When a borrower exhibits financial reports highly comparable to its peers, more investors, including uninformed investors, are attracted to form a syndicate, and lead lenders do not need to retain a large share of the loan to signal loan quality. The effects of accounting comparability on loan syndication structure are both statistically and economically significant.
In our estimations in the subsections ''Testing H1: Comparability and Loan Pricing'' and ''Testing H2: Comparability and Non-Pricing Contractual Terms,'' we assume that the pricing and non-pricing terms are determined independently. However, *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. This table estimates the cross-sectional relationship between comparability and the presence of accounting-based performance pricing provision and financial covenants in loan contracts for the period 1992-2008. Columns (1), (3), (5), and (6) report the industry and year fixed effect results, and Columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) contain marginal effects. The t-stats reported in brackets are based on White standard errors corrected for firm clustering. All variables are defined in Appendix B.
pricing terms (e.g., spread) and non-pricing terms (e.g., collateral requirement and loan maturity) in a loan contract may be determined jointly. Ignoring potential interaction among pricing and non-pricing terms may obscure the true effects of comparability on these variables (Melnik and Plaut 1986) . To address this issue, we use a simultaneous equation model to reestimate, simultaneously, our results concerning cost of debt, collateral, and loan maturity. Dennis, Nandy, and Sharpe (2000) and Bharath et al. (2011) assume a unidirectional relationship between pricing and non-pricing terms. Specifically, Bharath et al. (2011) assume that: (1) maturity and collateral are jointly determined (bidirectional relationship); and (2) cost of debt is affected by maturity and collateral, but it does not affect maturity and collateral (unidirectional relationship). These authors *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. This table estimates the cross-sectional relationship between accounting comparability and the time needed to complete the syndication process for the period 1992-2009. The dependent variable is the number of days between the loan deal launch date and deal active date. The t-stats reported in brackets are based on White standard errors corrected for firm clustering. All variables are defined in Appendix B.
argue that these assumptions are substantiated by their discussion with bankers regarding the loan syndication process. 18 Thus, following Bharath et al. (2011), we estimate the following Instrumental Variable (IV) regression: 18 Bharath et al. (2011) provide a detailed discussion with industry professionals: ''For example, the S&P Guide to Loan Markets (2006) describes the process in several discrete steps. Syndication starts by the borrower appointing the lead bank, which conducts due diligence and hammers out the nonprice loan features such as amount, collateral, maturity, and covenants with the borrower and leaves the final price (as yet) to be determined. At this stage, the lead bank would informally poll potential syndicate members to gauge the level of interest in the loan. This information is used to set the interest rate on the loan and it is launched for syndication.'' Thus, it makes the assumption of price terms being determined after the settlement of nonprice terms quite realistic.
where a AC , a CM , and a MC are the coefficients arising from the interdependence of the dependent variables; and X S , X C , and X M are vectors of the exogenous variables that affect spread, collateral, and maturity, respectively. Essentially, we estimate a twostage least squares regression and use the instrumented effect of endogenous variables for each regression in Equation (2). To address the issue that the system of equations has both a discrete variable (Secured) and continuous variables (Spread and Log(Maturity)), we follow Bharath et al. (2011) by estimating the probability of collateral requirements, then use the predicted value as an instrument for Secured in the IV estimation. In the Spread equation, we include the prevailing loan default spread as the instrument variable. The prevailing loan default spread (Default Spread) is measured as the difference between the yields on Moody's seasoned corporate bonds with Baa ratings and ten-year U.S. government bonds. We include Industry Tangibility as an instrument in the Secured equation because firms in industries with greater amounts of tangible assets are more likely to provide collateral. Berger and Udell (1990) find that the likelihood of a lender requiring collateral is higher when the current loan size is greater relative to the size of the total debt. Thus, we employ loan concentration (Loan Concentration) as an instrumental variable for debt collateralization. As discussed above in ''Testing H1: Comparability and Loan Pricing,'' a firm's industry membership in a regulated industry (Regulated Industry) and its asset maturity (Log(Asset Maturity)) can both affect loan maturity. Thus, we include these two variables in the Log(Maturity) equation as the instrument variables.
The results of the IV estimation are presented in Table 8 . Panels A and B report the results for the estimation using CompAcct4 and CompAcctInd as measures of comparability, respectively. In Panel A, Column (1) we report the results for the Spread equation, controlling for simultaneous determination of Log(Maturity) and Secured. The coefficient on CompAcct4 is significant (t-statistic ¼ À2.660) at the 1 percent level, suggesting that after controlling for simultaneity of loan contracting terms, comparability lowers the cost of borrowing. The coefficients on Log(Maturity) and Secured are no longer statistically significant once we control for the endogeneity of these two variables, in contrast to the significant coefficients reported in Table 2 . The coefficient on Default Spread is significantly positive, suggesting that in a period with higher default spread, borrowers tend to incur higher borrowing costs.
Column (2) of Table 8 , Panel A reports IV regression results for loan maturity. We find that the effect of comparability on loan maturity becomes stronger and more significant (t-statistic ¼ 2.988) as compared to the coefficient estimate reported in Column (1) of Table 4 , suggesting that the single-equation approach underestimates the effect of comparability on loan maturity. The coefficient on the exogenous variable Regulated Industry is negative and insignificant, while the coefficient on the other exogenous variable Log(Asset Maturity) is positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level (t-statistic ¼ 2.282). The coefficient on Secured is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level, consistent with the results reported in Table 4 .
Column (3) of Table 8 , Panel A reports the IV estimation results for the probability of secured loans. The coefficient on CompAcct4 is negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level (t-statistic ¼ À6.831), indicating that the effect of comparability on secured loans is robust to simultaneous determination of the contractual terms. The coefficients on the exogenous instruments Industry Tangibility and Loan Concentration are both significantly positive. Panel B of Table 8 reports the simultaneous estimation results using CompAcctInd as the measure of comparability. These results are similar to those reported in Panel A.
We also test the relevance and validity of our instrument variables. Partial F-statistics in Table 8 indicate that Default Spread is a strong instrument for Spread and that Log(Asset Maturity) and Regulated Industry are, collectively, strong instruments for Log(Maturity). The Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistics for the Spread and Log(Maturity) estimations (ranging from 35.075 to 99.064) are all higher than the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical value of 19.93, and the Hansen J-statistics are all insignificant (ranging from 0.014 to 1.104). These test results largely fail to reject the null hypothesis that our instruments are relevant and valid.
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In short, after controlling for the simultaneous determination of Spread, Log(Maturity), and Secured, we continue to find supporting evidence for H1, H2a, and H2b.
Economic Comparability and Accounting Comparability: Evidence from Using Accrual Comparability and Cash Flow Comparability
Our evidence so far indicates that accounting comparability reduces loan investors' information processing costs, as well as monitoring costs, and, therefore, loan investors offer more favorable contracting terms (i.e., lower cost of debt, less likely to require collateral, and longer maturity), the loan syndicate is formed quicker, and there is a greater participation of loan investors. Although using an earnings comparability measure is advantageous in our setting because it captures the aggregate effect of reporting discretion a firm can have on the translation of economic income into accounting income, there is a concern that earnings comparability might also reflect economic comparability of firms, despite the fact that we control for economic comparability by matching firms on industry and adjusting for industry and firm size in the regressions. To address this concern, we construct another measure of accounting comparability, accrual comparability, which is expected to reflect the similarity of accrual accounting in mapping firm underlying performance to accounting numbers. This approach is motivated by a series of recent studies on accounting comparability (i.e., Francis et al. 2014; Kim, J. Lee, and B. Lee 2014; Park 2013) Other control variables As in Column (1) of Table 2 As in Column (1) of Table 4 As in Column (1) of that demonstrate that accrual comparability captures accounting comparability rather than economic comparability. 20 Following these studies, we construct two accrual comparability measures, CompAcct4_ACC and CompAcctInd_ACC, by replacing Earnings (in Appendix A, Equations (A2) and (A3)) with Accruals, where Accruals is defined as the total accruals calculated based on the balance sheet (Sloan 1996) . We replace the earnings comparability measures with the two accrual comparability measures in the regressions and repeat our analyses from earlier in this section.
The results are reported in Table 9 . In general, the evidence in Table 9 suggests that our findings are not driven by economic comparability. Particularly, we show that the accrual comparability measure, CompAcct4_ACC, has independent effects on cost of debt, collateral, loan syndication time, and syndicate concentration, as we predicted. We also find marginal significance for the relation between accrual comparability and financial covenants. The results using the alternative accrual Other control variables As in Column (1) of Table 2 As in Column (1) of Table 4 As in Column (1) of *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. This table presents the results from the above system of equations using instrumental variables to estimate the impact of accounting comparability on loan spread, maturity, and collateral. The default spread is used as an instrument for loan spread; asset maturity and industry membership in a regulated industry are used as instruments for loan maturity; industry tangibility ratio and loan concentration ratio are used as instruments for securitized loans. Panels A and B report the results using CompAcct4 and CompAcctInd as a measure of accounting comparability, respectively. The t-stats (z-stats) reported in brackets are based on White standard errors corrected for firm clustering. All variables are defined in Appendix B.
20 Francis et al.'s (2014) finding that auditor style affects accounting comparability through reporting of accruals lends support to using accrual comparability in our setting. Decomposing accounting comparability into accrual comparability and cash flow comparability, Kim et al. (2014) show that accrual comparability, rather than cash flow comparability, reduces investors' (i.e., financial analysts') information processing costs and leads to lower optimistic forecast errors for firms with high accruals. Park (2013) provides empirical evidence that analyst forecast accuracy is higher for firms with higher accrual comparability.
comparability, CompAcctInd_ACC, are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 9 and, hence, are not tabulated to conserve space.
Additional Robustness Tests
In this section, we conduct additional robustness tests. To save space, we only report the coefficients on the variable of interest, CompAcct4. The results using the alternative comparability measure (CompAcctInd) are qualitatively similar and available upon request. First, it is possible that the accounting comparability measures used in this study may not only reflect the comparability of a firm's accounting system, but also reflect time-invariant unobservable differences among the firms, which will lead us to wrongly conclude that accounting comparability affects contracting terms and loan syndication time and syndicate structure. To address the concern of omitted time-invariant variables, we reestimate the spread, collateral, maturity, performance pricing, financial covenants, loan syndication time, and loan syndicate concentration regressions using firm fixed effects. (1)- (9) report the estimation results for models using loan spread, collateral, maturity, accounting-based performance pricing, financial covenants, loan syndication duration, and measures of loan syndication structure as dependent variables, respectively. The tstats or z-stats reported in brackets are based on White standard errors corrected for firm clustering. All variables are defined in Appendix B. *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. This table presents the results estimating the cross-sectional relationship between accounting comparability and loan contracting terms and loan syndicate structure for the period 1992-2008. Columns (1)-(9) report the estimation results for models using loan spread, collateral, maturity, accounting-ratio based performance pricing, financial covenants, loan syndication duration, and measures of loan syndication structure as dependent variables, respectively, controlling for firm fixed effect. The t-stats reported in brackets are based on White standard errors corrected for firm clustering. All variables are defined in Appendix B.
The estimation results are reported in Table 10 . We show that the coefficient of CompAcct4 in the spread regressions is À5.563 and statistically significant at the 10 percent level. In the collateral regressions, the coefficient on CompAcct4 is significantly negative at the 1 percent level, larger than those in the OLS regressions reported in Table 3 . Similarly, in the performance pricing and loan syndicate structure regression, firm fixed effect regressions do not alter our inferences. However, when we estimate firm fixed effects for maturity (loan syndication duration) regressions, the coefficient on CompAcct4 is not statistically significant. Overall, the results from firm fixed effects regressions suggest that the observed relation between accounting comparability and cost of debt, collateral requirement, usage of performance pricing, and loan syndicate structure is not due to omitted unobservable firm characteristics.
In addition, we performed two tests including removing firm-year observations during the financial crisis and removing financial firms. 21 The estimation results are reported in Table 11 . In general, our main results still hold with respect to these various robustness tests except that in the loan syndication duration regression, the coefficient on CompAcct4 is still negative, but insignificant when financial firms are removed from the sample. *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. This table presents the results estimating the cross-sectional relationship between accounting comparability and loan contracting terms and loan syndicate structure for the period 1992-2008. Columns (1)-(9) report the estimation results for models using loan spread, collateral, maturity, accounting-based performance pricing, financial covenants, measures of loan syndication duration, and measures of loan syndication structure as dependent variables, respectively. Panel A contains regression results based on the subsample that does not contain firm-year observations during the financial crisis period. Panel B contains regression results based on the subsample that does not contain financial firm observations. The t-stats reported in brackets are based on White standard errors corrected for firm clustering. All variables are defined in Appendix B. 
